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Pointing Guns 
Joseph Blocher, Samuel W. Buell, Jacob D. Charles, and 
Darrell A.H. Miller* 
The American gun debate is increasingly populated with scenes of people 
pointing and otherwise displaying guns. What is the legal regime governing gun 
displays, and how well can it address the distinct social and legal problems they 
pose? In this Essay, we argue that the current structure of criminal law does not 
supply clear rules of conduct sufficient to avoid the negative effects of gun 
displays, and that the rhetorical and expressive effects of Second Amendment 
debates threaten to make the situation worse. We also suggest how the legal rules 
might be improved, and how battles over norms—as much as criminal 
prohibitions and defenses—will continue to shape both social practice and law 
when it comes to displays of firearms in public and towards other persons.  
Introduction  
Threatening displays of guns in the United States appear to be on the 
rise in 2020. A man wearing a protective mask to guard against COVID-19 
confronts an unmasked shopper in a Walmart in Royal Palm Beach, Florida, 
and they argue about masking in the store.1 The unmasked man pulls a 
handgun out of his waistband and points it at the other shopper, who says the 
armed man threatened his life. Police investigate and, ten days later, charge 
the armed man with aggravated assault.2 Prosecutors later drop the charges, 
stating that “all legally required elements of the crime” cannot be proven.3 
A dispute in a Chipotle parking lot in Orion Township, Michigan, flares 
when a white couple backs out of a parking space as a black family is walking 
behind the vehicle.4 The female passenger pulls out a handgun as the 
 
* Faculty, Duke Law School. Many thanks to Kim Ferzan for helpful comments on a draft. 
1. Kristina Webb, Man Arrested After Pulling Gun in Mask Argument at Royal  
Palm Beach Walmart, PALM BEACH POST (July 23, 2020, 10:21 AM), https://www 
.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/coronavirus/2020/07/23/man-arrested-after-pulling-gun-in-mask-
argument-at-royal-palm-beach-walmart/112345530 [https://perma.cc/UP4A-JXCY]. 
2. Austen Erblat, Shopper Charged with Pulling Gun in Walmart During Mask Dispute Posts 
$15,000 Bond, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (July 24, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com
/news/crime/fl-ne-walmart-gun-mask-arrested-charged-20200723-tma2ajnkoraodlhjcuqt2szcaa-
story.html [https://perma.cc/N6Z8-F4MM]. 
3. Wayne K. Roustan & Austen Erblat, No Charges for Shopper Who Pulled a Gun in Walmart 
Mask Dispute, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (Sept. 1, 2020, 10:10 AM), https://www.sun-sentinel.com
/local/palm-beach/fl-ne-walmart-gun-charges-dropped-20200901-dkkknwn5mbdtlkbd75fg46tjwe-
story.html [https://perma.cc/HL7Z-LFJD]. 
4. Jasmin Barmore & Sarah Rahal, Two Arraigned After Gun Drawn over Bump at Orion Twp. 
Chipotle, DET. NEWS (July 3, 2020, 6:13 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local
/oakland-county/2020/07/02/woman-pulls-gun-orion-township-michigan/5365854002/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7AZN-T35S]. 
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argument escalates. She and her companion are charged with felonious 
assault.  
A white St. Louis couple standing in their front yard display a semi-
automatic rifle and point a handgun at demonstrators protesting police use of 
force as the crowd moves along the road and sidewalk in front of their house.5 
The local prosecutor charges them with felony exhibition of a weapon. The 
President of the United States calls the criminal investigation “a disgrace,” 
the Attorney General of Missouri inserts himself into the litigation with an 
extraordinary amicus brief arguing that the charges chill gun rights and 
should be dismissed, and the Governor of Missouri announces that he will 
pardon the couple if they are convicted of a crime.6  
Demonstrators clad in quasi-military gear and openly carrying sidearms 
and semi-automatic rifles appear on the streets in cities and towns across the 
nation. The spectacles range from heavily armed protestors storming the 
Michigan capitol building7 to a man ordering a sandwich in a North Carolina 
restaurant with a rocket launcher strapped to his back.8 
Sadly, these events have not all been bloodless gun-rights pageantry. A 
man carrying an AK-47 rifle during a Black Lives Matter demonstration in 
Austin, Texas, was shot and killed by a motorist who claimed that the victim 
pointed the rifle at him as he drove through the crowd.9 In Kenosha, 
Wisconsin, a seventeen-year-old self-designated city defender openly 
 
5. Azi Paybarah & Aimee Ortiz, Felony Charges Filed Against St. Louis Couple Who Pointed 
Guns at Protesters, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/20/us/mark-
patricia-mccloskey-charges.html [https://perma.cc/KCF7-B2U7]; see also Eric Ruben, The 
Distortion of Self-Defense and the Second Amendment in Missouri, DUKE CTR. FOR FIREARMS L.: 
SECOND THOUGHTS BLOG (July 23, 2020), https://firearmslaw.duke.edu/2020/07/the-distortion-of-
self-defense-and-the-second-amendment-in-missouri/ [https://perma.cc/3TJV-TY65] (describing 
the couple’s actions and purported feelings upon seeing the protestors). 
6. Paybarah & Ortiz, supra note 5. The couple later spoke at the Republican National 
Convention. Joan E. Greve, St Louis Couple Who Threatened Black Lives Matter Protesters Speak 
at RNC, GUARDIAN (Aug. 25, 2020, 12:31 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/aug
/24/st-louis-couple-rnc-mark-patricia-mccloskey [https://perma.cc/R7WX-XSZZ]. 
7. See Craig Mauger, Protesters, Some Armed, Enter Michigan Capitol in Rally  
Against COVID-19 Limits, DET. NEWS (Apr. 30, 2020, 8:16 PM), https://www.detroitnews 
.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/04/30/protesters-gathering-outside-capitol-amid-covid-19-
restrictions/3054911001/ [https://perma.cc/L9BR-58WH] (describing the actions of protestors and 
noting that some were openly carrying firearms). 
8. Thankfully, the rocket launcher was affixed with a sticker: “inert.” Justin Wise, Armed Stay-
at-Home Demonstrators Visit North Carolina Subway Shop, THE HILL (May 11, 2020, 8:38 AM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/497073-armed-demonstrators-protesting-stay-at-home-
order-visit-north-carolina [https://perma.cc/R4MA-R94P]. 
9. David Montgomery & Manny Fernandez, Garrett Foster Brought His Gun to Austin Protests. 
Then He Was Shot Dead., N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/26/us
/austin-shooting-texas-protests.html [https://perma.cc/86V6-NYL6]. 
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carrying an AR-15 rifle—and greeted warmly by the local police—killed two 
protesters and wounded a third.10 
There have been many more such incidents, reported and unreported.11 
A reasonable observer might expect, at a minimum, that American criminal 
law would have a clear regime to guide and control not only the acquisition 
and firing of guns, but their display—a regime that accounts for both the 
Second Amendment and widespread private possession of firearms. 
Traditional criminal law does govern here. Indeed, many prominent 
incidents (although not as many as one might expect) have resulted in arrests 
for brandishing, assault with a firearm, menacing with a firearm, and other 
related crimes.12 But the traditional machinery of criminal law falls woefully 
short of effectively regulating gun displays in a society as saturated with 
firearms as the United States. It delivers neither clear rules of conduct to 
inform people what they are allowed to do, nor clear rules of decision to 
instruct police and prosecutors what to permit and when to intervene.13 
The purpose of this Essay is to describe gun displays as a distinct social 
and legal phenomenon, to sketch the applicable legal rules, to explain why 
and how those rules fall short, and to identify some of the costs of the present 
legal regime. The lack of effective rules likely contributes to violence, terror, 
racial inequities, and costly legal uncertainty—including for gun owners 
themselves. We map the terrain and boundaries of this serious and growing 
problem with reference to social practices, criminal law, and constitutional 
law. We then conclude with some provisional thoughts about the possibilities 
and limits of legal reform and the critical importance of social norms if the 
country is to move toward a more stable and safer equilibrium.  
 
10. Graham Kates, Homicide Charges Announced Against Kyle Rittenhouse, Accused of Killing 
2 at Kenosha Protests, CBS NEWS (Aug. 30, 2020, 7:22 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news
/kyle-rittenhouse-homicide-charges-kenosha-shooting-first-degree-homicide-jacob-blake-protest-
wisconsin/ [https://perma.cc/T6ZJ-2NXN]; Haley Willis, Muyi Xiao, Christiaan Triebert, Christoph 
Koettl, Stella Cooper, David Botti, John Ismay & Ainara Tiefenthäler, Tracking the Suspect in the 
Fatal Kenosha Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/27/ 
us/kyle-rittenhouse-kenosha-shooting-video.html [https://perma.cc/EM8X-73SM]. 
11. See, e.g., Tom Batchelor, Louisville Police Officer Filmed Giving Advice to Heavily-Armed 
‘Militia,’ NEWSWEEK (Sept. 24, 2020, 7:48 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/louisville-police-
officer-breonna-taylor-protests-militia-1534025 [https://perma.cc/AKF6-SLTP] (relaying an 
incident of gun-rights pageantry carried out by a self-styled “militia” in Louisville, Kentucky). 
12. See infra subparts II(A)–(B). 
13. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in 
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 648–49 (1984) (exploring the dual function of substantive 
criminal prohibitions in guiding both primary conduct and the conduct of legal actors). 
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I.  Gun Displays as a Distinct Social and Legal Phenomenon 
The American gun debate tends to focus on bodies and bullets14—if and 
how gun laws can help prevent some of the roughly 100,000 shootings every 
year, or the 40,000 or so deaths from gunshots (mostly by suicide).15 This 
focus is sensible, as even a one-percent change in casualties could mean 
hundreds of lives saved. Of course, the answers are not empirically, legally, 
or politically easy. Although most Americans think guns should be more 
tightly regulated,16 others argue that the carnage would be even worse with 
fewer guns.17 And the Second Amendment precludes some policy options.18  
But the social and legal lives of guns are much more complicated than 
the focus on bullets and bodies suggests. The vast majority of legally relevant 
gun-related activity, whether salutary, benign, or unwelcome, does not 
involve pulling a trigger. Most self-reported defensive gun uses, for example, 
involve the simple display of a gun, not its actual discharge.19 Many gun-
carriers emphasize the peace of mind, confidence, and concentration they feel 
carrying a gun,20 and the positive externalities—including safety—they 
believe accrue to those around them.21 
 
14. See Reva B. Siegel & Joseph Blocher, Why Regulate Guns?, 48 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
(SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT) 11, 15 (2020) (asserting that the scope of the American gun control debate 
is unduly limited to public safety concerns, ignoring other legitimate interests like the “freedom and 
confidence to participate in every domain of our shared life”). 
15. Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS), CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/ [https://perma.cc/KX5Z-GE4U] 
(to show recorded incidents of firearm deaths and injuries, filter data to show “firearms” as the 
“mechanism of death”). 
16. Katherine Schaeffer, Share of Americans Who Favor Stricter Gun Laws Has Increased 
Since 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/16
/share-of-americans-who-favor-stricter-gun-laws-has-increased-since-2017/ [https://perma.cc/ 
PM7K-D82F]. 
17. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN-
CONTROL LAWS 19 (1998) (inferring from an observed inverse correlation between gun ownership 
and crime that widespread gun ownership discourages criminal activity). 
18. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (“[T]he enshrinement of 
constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”). 
19. Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-
Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 173, 184 tbl.2 (1995) (reporting between 
2.2 and 2.5 million defensive gun uses per year, with only about 200,000 involving physical harm). 
20. See Terrence D. Hill, Benjamin Dowd-Arrow, Andrew P. Davis & Amy M. Burdette, 
Happiness Is a Warm Gun? Gun Ownership and Happiness in the United States (1973–2018), SSM 
- POPULATION HEALTH, Apr. 2020, at 1, 2 (noting and explaining “several ways that guns could 
promote happiness,” including freedom from fear and increased feelings of empowerment); Clayton 
E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: The New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 
62 TENN. L. REV. 679, 722 (1995) (“[I]f people feel safer because they carry a gun and in turn lead 
happier lives because they feel safer and more secure, then the carrying of guns makes a direct and 
nontrivial contribution to their overall quality of life.”). 
21. See generally JENNIFER CARLSON, CITIZEN-PROTECTORS: THE EVERYDAY POLITICS OF 
GUNS IN AN AGE OF DECLINE (2015) (discussing common rationales for carrying firearms and 
demonstrating that these rationales are a product of our societal setting). 
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Some gun owners carry their guns in public to normalize conduct that 
others—even other gun owners—regard as irresponsible or threatening. 
When Texas “open carry” advocates took their rifles into fast-food 
restaurants in 2014, the NRA issued a statement saying that such activity 
“defies common sense . . . shows a lack of consideration and manners 
. . . [and] not only is . . . rare, it’s downright weird.”22 The strong statement 
led to a backlash by those eager to change the norms surrounding open carry 
and the organization quickly retracted it.23 This kind of norm 
entrepreneurialism by gun owners can, and is designed to, shift social 
practices so as to shape the law and the cultural perception of gun use. 
 Not all agree that this change in norms is necessarily for the better. 
Apprehension over what one former NRA president described as “the general 
promiscuous toting of guns”24 appears to be broadly shared. Indeed, many 
gun owners express discomfort with a norm of carrying firearms anyplace a 
person happens to be.25 Undoubtedly, gun displays can and do impose 
negative externalities. Some studies have found that most people report 
feeling less safe when others around them have guns.26 
That feeling alone is not enough to make others’ conduct unlawful, 
however. In states where open carry is legal (nearly all of them), the mere act 
 
22. Eric Lach, NRA Issues Amazing Statement Admitting Bringing AR-15s to Chipotle Is Dumb, 
TALKING POINTS MEMO (June 2, 2014, 10:34 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/nra-
open-carry-texas-weird-statement [https://perma.cc/QEH7-7HXQ]. 
23. Eric Lach, NRA Apologizes for Calling Guns-in-Restaurants Crowd ‘Weird,’ TALKING 
POINTS MEMO (June 3, 2014, 6:35 PM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/nra-apologizes-
open-carry-texas [https://perma.cc/N37C-LERW]. 
24. Michael S. Rosenwald, The Forgotten NRA Leader Who Thought Carrying Guns Should Be 
‘Sharply Restricted,’ CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 7, 2017, 11:45 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/nation-
world/ct-forgotten-nra-leader-gun-control-20171007-story.html [https://perma.cc/TG26-JVH3]; 
see also Jacob Sullum, When the NRA Opposed Open Carry, REASON (June 17, 2014, 3:25 PM), 
https://reason.com/2014/06/17/when-the-nra-opposed-open-carry/ [https://perma.cc/V9CJ-BF9R] 
(citing the NRA’s support of California’s Mulford Act, which banned open carrying of loaded 
firearms). Then-Governor Ronald Reagan, supporting a tightening of California’s gun laws after the 
Black Panthers entered the state legislature openly carrying firearms, said: “There’s no reason why 
on the street today a citizen should be carrying loaded weapons.” Cynthia Deitle Leonardatos, 
California’s Attempts to Disarm the Black Panthers, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 972 (1999). 
25. In a 2015 survey, gun owners were most supportive of carrying firearms into restaurants 
(59%) but least supportive of carrying firearms in bars (26%). Only 16% supported carrying 
firearms in a broad swath of public places such as schools, stadiums, churches, and government 
buildings. See Julia A. Wolfson, Stephen P. Teret, Deborah Azrael & Matthew Miller, US Public 
Opinion on Carrying Firearms in Public Places, 107 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 929, 933 fig.2 (2017). 
26. See, e.g., D. Hemenway, D. Azrael & M. Miller, National Attitudes Concerning Gun 
Carrying in the United States, 7 INJ. PREVENTION 282, 283 (2001); cf. McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 891 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Your interest in keeping and bearing 
a certain firearm may diminish my interest in being and feeling safe from armed violence.”). 
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of toting a visible weapon is not a crime.27 But, as we explain below, small 
changes in how a weapon is carried can transform activity from legally 
protected to prohibited. Just as displaying weapons may be an 
underappreciated form of defensive gun use, there is every reason to think 
that displaying guns is also an underappreciated form of crime.  
It is difficult to know how many Americans are illegally threatened with 
guns each year, in part because victims of such threats do not show up in 
hospital emergency rooms. It is not our purpose to make an original empirical 
claim comparing criminal gun displays with the number of justified defensive 
uses of guns. Defensive gun use is a matter of considerable dispute, with oft-
cited estimates varying by a factor of ten or more.28 There is already extensive 
scholarly literature on whether expansive public carry laws lead to more or 
less crime.29 Instead, our point is that the gun debate’s focus on violent crime, 
particularly homicide, tends to leave other risks and costs of gun displays 
unaccounted for in the empirical literature and unaddressed by the current 
legal rules.  
In short, gun displays are a distinct and important social and legal 
phenomenon with very high stakes. Consider that some self-reported surveys 
indicate that, of the 2.2 to 2.5 million defensive gun uses annually, only about 
200,000 involved physical wounding of the assailant.30 (Both of these 
numbers appear to be overestimates, considering that only 100,000 shooting 
victims are treated in hospitals every year; for our purposes the ratio is what 
matters.)31 But that does not mean that nothing legally relevant happens when 
no one is shot. Inevitably, some (likely significant) portion of these incidents 
involve false positives: mistaken apprehension of a threat, for example, 
leading the gun owner to brandish his weapon and the other person to flee. 
The gun owner leaves the scene thinking that he has successfully defended 
 
27. It might, however, be enough to support a stop and frisk. See United States v. Robinson, 
846 F.3d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc). But see United States v. Watson, 900 F.3d 892, 895–
96 (7th Cir. 2018) (Barrett, J.) (holding that merely displaying weapons where lawful does not give 
rise to reasonable suspicion). 
28. See generally The Challenges of Defining and Measuring Defensive Gun Use, RAND CORP. 
(Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.rand.org/research/gun-policy/analysis/essays/defensive-gun-use.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y8SJ-QH49] (describing the measurement difficulties in estimating the incidence 
of defensive gun uses and the resulting large variation in estimates). 
29. Compare LOTT, supra note 17, at 19–20 (concluding that citizen carry laws aid in reducing 
crime), with Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” 
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1201–02 (2003) (describing shortcomings in the statistical 
models used by Lott and asserting that “if anything, there is stronger evidence for the conclusion 
that [shall-issue] laws increase crime than there is for the conclusion that they decrease it”). 
30. Kleck & Gertz, supra note 19. 
31. See David Hemenway, Survey Research and Self-Defense Gun Use: An Explanation of 
Extreme Overestimates, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1430, 1442–44 (1997) (comparing Kleck 
and Gertz’s estimates of assailants wounded by gun-carrying victims to the number of non-fatal 
firearm-related injuries treated in emergency rooms each year and analyzing issues in their 
estimates). 
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himself, but (depending on some of the factors we discuss in Part II) the other 
person may have been the victim of a crime. In one study, researchers 
summarized self-reported defensive gun uses from a survey and then sent the 
summaries to criminal court judges. Even taking the facts as true, and 
assuming the gun owner was legally armed and carrying, the judges 
concluded roughly half of the incidents to be potentially illegal.32 
These costs do not fall on everyone equally. Recent headlines and 
cellphone recordings illustrate what research has long shown: Gun displays 
are likely to have racialized distributional effects, because threat perception 
is strongly correlated with various kinds of implicit racial bias.33 This 
suggests African Americans are disproportionately likely to be victimized by 
crimes like brandishing and gun-related assault—incidents that gun owners 
may wrongly perceive as self-defense—because African Americans are more 
likely to be seen as threatening. Studies have found that identical behavior—
an ambiguous shove, say—is many times more likely to be characterized as 
“violent behavior” when the person doing the shoving is black and the 
“victim” is white.34 Even absent physical contact, studies have found that 
young black men are perceived as bigger (taller, heavier, more muscular) and 
more physically threatening (stronger, more capable of harm) than young 
white men,35 and that higher implicit prejudice is associated with a greater 
 
32. D. Hemenway, D. Azrael & M. Miller, Gun Use in the United States: Results from Two 
National Surveys, 6 INJ. PREVENTION 263, 264–65 (2000); see also Otis Dudley Duncan, As 
Compared to What? Offensive and Defensive Gun Use Surveys, 1973–94, at 10–11 (Nat’l Inst. of 
Just., Working Paper No. 185056, 2000) (describing interpretive problems with surveys in which 
respondents are asked about their defensive use of guns and noting that the respondents may have 
been mistaken about the threat and whether they themselves committed an assault); Otis Dudley 
Duncan, Gun Use Surveys: In Numbers We Trust?, CRIMINOLOGIST, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 1, 1, 3 
(providing examples of the misuse of survey data involving the defensive use of guns due to, among 
other things, confusion about whether the defensive gun use by survey respondents was actually 
lawful). 
33. See, e.g., Michael C. Gearhart, Kristen A. Berg, Courtney Jones & Sharon D. Johnson, Fear 
of Crime, Racial Bias, and Gun Ownership, 44 HEALTH & SOC. WORK 241, 242, 245–46 (2019) 
(reporting research findings indicating that gun owners are more vigilant in responding to perceived 
threats and more likely to direct their vigilance at racial and ethnic minorities). 
34. Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: 
Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 590, 595–
97 (1976) (75% of participants characterized the shove as violent when the protagonist was black 
and the victim white, compared to only 17% when the races in the scenario were switched); see also 
Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudices: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break the Prejudice 
Habit, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733, 753 (1995) (describing a study of schoolchildren that found both 
black and white children perceive ambiguously aggressive behaviors of black individuals as more 
threatening than the same behaviors of white individuals). 
35. See, e.g., H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black 
and White Children’s Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 590, 590, 596 (1980) (“Cultural differences between subject groups were apparent in the 
greater tendency of the white children to read threat into ambiguously aggressive behaviors 
involving no physical contact and to assume that the perpetrators of such behaviors were stronger 
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readiness to perceive anger in black faces.36 The “presumption of 
dangerousness” that corresponds with darker skin tones and stronger 
Afrocentric facial features37 may not only lead to more gun displays against 
black people but also influence how jurors and other decisionmakers evaluate 
the lawfulness of the display.38  
One particular scenario that might cause a gun owner (or for that matter, 
a police officer39) to pull his weapon in self-defense is the impression that the 
person he is confronting is also armed. Although they are not equally 
distributed, there are more than 300 million guns in private hands in the 
United States.40 The more guns in a society, the more likely individuals will 
assume others are armed.41 In any given encounter, however, that impression 
might be mistaken. And the mistakes also are not equally distributed; 
evidence shows that one form of threat-perception failure—mistaking 
innocuous objects for weapons—is especially likely when the other person is 
black.42 One study found that participants primed with a white face were 
more likely to mistake a gun for a tool, while those primed with a black face 
 
than the recipients.”); John Paul Wilson, Kurt Hugenberg & Nicholas O. Rule, Racial Bias in 
Judgments of Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat, 113 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCH. 59, 60 (2017) (pointing to seven different studies reaching this conclusion). 
36. Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice: Implicit Prejudice and the 
Perception of Facial Threat, 14 PSYCH. SCI. 640, 641–42 (2003). 
37. Mark W. Bennett & Victoria C. Plaut, Looking Criminal and the Presumption of 
Dangerousness: Afrocentric Facial Features, Skin Tone, and Criminal Justice, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 745, 785 (2018) (“Repeated studies indicate Blacks with darker skin tones and stronger 
Afrocentric facial features ‘activate automatic associations with negative behavioral stereotypes of 
Black men, such as aggression, violence, and criminality.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
38. Morgan A. Birck, Do You See What I See? Problems with Juror Bias in Viewing Body-
Camera Video Evidence, 24 MICH. J. RACE & L. 153, 172 (2018). 
39. Lois James, The Stability of Implicit Racial Bias in Police Officers, 21 POLICE Q. 30, 40–
41 (2018) (“[O]fficers tended to have moderate (35%) to strong (37%) bias associating Black 
Americans with weapons. Approximately 12% of officers had slight anti-Black bias and a further 
12% had no bias. Finally, a combined 3% of the sample had anti-White bias (associating White 
Americans with weapons).”). 
40. Scott Horsley, Guns in America, by the Numbers, NPR (Jan. 5, 2016, 12:09 PM), https://
www.npr.org/2016/01/05/462017461/guns-in-america-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/ZQU8-
RNTN]. 
41. Cf. Jill Lepore, The Long Blue Line, NEW YORKER, July 20, 2020, at 64, 65 (noting that 
“[t]he difference [between the U.S. and other countries] is guns”—in Finland, the police fired six 
bullets in all of 2013, whereas in Pasco, Washington, three police officers fired seventeen in one 
day in 2015). 
42. See Cynthia Lee, Race, Policing, and Lethal Force: Remedying Shooter Bias with Martial 
Arts Training, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2016, at 145, 157–58 (summarizing a 2012 shooter 
bias study in which both civilians and police offers were quicker to identify black individuals as 
carrying a firearm than individuals of any other race). 
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were more likely to mistake a tool for a gun.43 Others have confirmed a direct 
(and bi-directional) link between blackness and guns.44  
Because threat perception is thoroughly racialized, African Americans 
are more likely to be victimized by gun crimes like brandishing and assault 
when the gun-bearer wrongly believes himself to be engaged in self-defense. 
And that, in turn, means African Americans will suffer disproportionately 
when the machinery of criminal law is insufficient to address these 
encounters.  
Another set of concerns are not specifically about race, but about guns 
more generally. Some studies have concluded that the mere presence of a 
firearm can prime people to behave more aggressively—a phenomenon 
known as the “weapons effect.”45 People in possession of a gun are more 
likely to classify other objects as guns and to engage in threat-induced 
 
43. D. Lisa Cothran, Facial Affect and Race Influence Threat Perception, 30 IMAGINATION 
COGNITION & PERSONALITY 341, 348 (2011); see also B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: 
The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCH. 181, 190 (2001) (“Results of this research strongly support the hypothesis that the 
race of faces paired with objects does influence the perceptual identification of weapons. . . . 
Harmless distracters were more likely to be classified as guns when primed by a Black face than 
when primed by a White face.”). 
44. Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing Black: 
Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 876, 878 (2004). Professor 
Eberhardt and her coauthors describe a study yielding such results as follows: 
In Study 1, we demonstrate that merely exposing people to Black male faces lowers 
the perceptual threshold at which they detect degraded images of crime-relevant 
objects (e.g., guns and knives). In Study 2, we show that exposing people to crime-
relevant objects prompts them to visually attend to Black male faces, suggesting that 
the association of Blacks and criminality is bidirectional. 
Id. See generally Charles M. Judd, Irene V. Blair & Kristine M. Chapleau, Automatic Stereotypes 
vs. Automatic Prejudice: Sorting Out the Possibilities in the Payne (2001) Weapon Paradigm, 40 J. 
EXP. SOC. PSYCH. 75, 75 (2004) (“In an extension of Payne’s procedure, we show that African-
American faces facilitate the categorization of both handguns and sports-related objects, but not the 
categorization of insects or fruits.” (analyzing Payne, supra note 43)). 
45. See, e.g., Arlin James Benjamin, Jr. & Brad J. Bushman, The Weapons Priming Effect, 
CURRENT OP. PSYCHOLOGY, Dec. 2016, at 45, 45 (describing multiple studies analyzing the 
“weapons effect” and its possible cognitive underpinnings); Craig A. Anderson, Arlin J. Benjamin, 
Jr. & Bruce D. Bartholow, Does the Gun Pull the Trigger? Automatic Priming Effects of Weapon 
Pictures and Weapon Names, 9 PSYCH. SCI. 308, 312 (1998) (proposing based on two experiments 
that the simple identification of weapons increases the accessibility of aggressive thoughts); see also 
Arlin J. Benjamin, Jr., Sven Kepes & Brad J. Bushman, Effects of Weapons on Aggressive Thoughts, 
Angry Feelings, Hostile Appraisals, and Aggressive Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the 
Weapons Effect Literature, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 347, 359 (2018) (summarizing a 
study which showed “merely seeing a weapon can increase aggressive thoughts, hostile appraisals, 
and aggressive behavior”); Brad J. Bushman, The “Weapons Effect,” PSYCH. TODAY  
(Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/get-/psyched/201301/the-weapons-
effect [https://perma.cc/DJB2-W9F8] (“Several studies have replicated the weapons effect.”). But 
see GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 29 (1991) (doubting the 
weapons effect studies, arguing that the “protection gun owners feel safer because they have a gun 
in their home . . . . [T]he net effect of home gun possession on gun owners is to reduce fear of 
crime”). 
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behavior, like raising their own gun to fire.46 Further, the presence of a gun 
has been linked to aggressive responses47—in particular, from men who have 
already been subject to aggression-eliciting stimuli.48 
These empirical findings suggest that the social practice of gun displays 
is unlikely to settle into a desirable equilibrium in which beneficial displays 
of guns outweigh the costs, or that any such social practice will avoid 
undesirable and inequitable distributional effects. In these circumstances, and 
faced with such harms, it makes sense to ask whether the criminal law is 
regulating, or can effectively regulate, this kind of behavior.  
II.  Criminal Law’s Deficiency in Regulating Gun Displays 
One might reasonably hope for the law to draw a clear line between 
defensive and criminal gun displays. And yet, as we explain below, that line 
is both thin and blurry. It is thin because small factual differences separate 
acts of self-defense from crime—the angle of the gun barrel, the precise 
location of the incident, the appearance of the perceived attacker, and so on. 
It is blurry because the legal standards that define the line themselves turn on 
hazy concepts like reasonableness, proportionality, and intent that are nearly 
impossible to clearly articulate ex ante. 
In contrast with, for example, possession-based gun crimes (like those 
prohibiting felons from having firearms), this lack of clarity is a significant 
deterrent for prosecutors and police and demands much of judges and juries. 
The haziness also makes it hard for people to know their legal rights: 
Criminal law does not provide clear guidance to either the citizen who 
wonders when she can display her weapon or the citizen who wonders if she 
has been victimized by such a display.  
A.  Offenses 
Is it a crime to point a gun at a person? As with all American criminal 
law, the specifics vary by state. But, in general, yes. 
 
46. Jessica K. Witt & James R. Brockmole, Action Alters Object Identification: Wielding a Gun 
Increases the Bias to See Guns, 38 J. EXP. PSYCH 1159, 1165 (2012). 
47. See generally David Hemenway, Mary Vriniotis & Matthew Miller, Is an Armed Society a 
Polite Society? Guns and Road Rage, 38 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 687 (2006). This 
study’s abstract characterizes its methods and results as follows: 
Data come from a 2004 national random digit dial survey of over 2400 licensed drivers. 
Respondents were asked whether, in the past year, they (1) made obscene or rude 
gestures at another motorist, (2) aggressively followed another vehicle too closely, and 
(3) were victims of such hostile behaviors. . . . Similar to a survey of Arizona 
motorists, in our survey, riding with a firearm in the vehicle was a marker for 
aggressive and dangerous driver behavior. 
Id. at 687. 
48. Leonard Berkowitz & Anthony LePage, Weapons as Aggression-Eliciting Stimuli, 7 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 202, 203 (1967). 
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Consider the jurisdictions governing some of the incidents described in 
the introduction. In Florida (the masking argument in the Walmart), 
misdemeanor assault is “an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do 
violence to the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, 
and doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other person 
that such violence is imminent.”49 This crime is a felony if committed “[w]ith 
a deadly weapon without intent to kill.” 50 In addition, it is a misdemeanor in 
Florida for any person carrying a firearm to, “in the presence of one or more 
persons, exhibit the same in a rude, careless, angry, or threatening manner, 
not in necessary self-defense.”51 Thus, Florida makes it a crime to point an 
actually or apparently loaded firearm at another person during most hostile 
encounters. Police initially filed charges in the Walmart incident on this 
theory. 
In Michigan (the confrontation in the Chipotle parking lot), assault with 
a firearm is a felony.52 Michigan does not define assault by statute but rather 
has incorporated the state’s common law of assault into its statutes.53 The 
relevant decisions unfortunately are not a model of clarity. But it is plain that 
Michigan law treats as assault some kinds of threatening behavior that 
involve no physical contact.54 
Michigan courts have defined simple assault as “an attempt to commit 
a battery or an unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehension 
of receiving an immediate battery”; as “any attempt or offer with force or 
violence to do a corporal hurt to another, whether from malice or wantonness, 
with such circumstances as denote at the time an intention to do it, coupled 
with a present ability to carry such intention into effect”; and as “any 
unlawful physical force partly or fully put in motion creating a reasonable 
apprehension of immediate injury to a human being.”55 
Plainly, pointing a firearm at another person and at a range that could 
inflict injury would satisfy these definitions of assault—as long as something 
about the circumstances, including but not limited to the words or behavior 
of the person doing the pointing, would cause a reasonable person to fear that 
 
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.011 (West 2020). 
50. Id. § 784.021; see also Cambell v. State, 37 So. 3d 948, 950 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“Nowhere does either statute require as an element of the crime that the accused had to intend to 
do physical harm to the victim.”). 
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.10. 
52. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.82(1) (West 2019). 
53. See People v. Gardner, 265 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Mich. 1978) (adopting the common law majority 
rule for the definition of assault). 
54. People v. Carlson, 125 N.W. 361, 362 (Mich. 1910). 
55. People v. Reeves, 580 N.W.2d 433, 435–36 (Mich. 1998); Gardner, 265 N.W.2d. at 7; 
Carlson, 125 N.W. at 362. 
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the gun might imminently be fired. Presumably that is the prosecutor’s theory 
behind the charges brought for the incident in the Chipotle parking lot.56 
Michigan’s code also criminalizes, as misdemeanors, “recklessly or 
heedlessly or willfully [handling] any firearm without due caution and 
circumspection for the rights, safety or property of others”57 and 
“intentionally but without malice point[ing] or aim[ing] a firearm at or 
toward another person.”58 
In Missouri (the St. Louis couple with guns in front of their home), 
misdemeanor assault consists of “purposely plac[ing] another person in 
apprehension of immediate physical injury.”59 Felony assault requires 
causing actual physical injury.60 However, it is a separate felony in Missouri 
to “knowingly . . . [e]xhibit[], in the presence of one or more persons, any 
weapon readily capable of lethal use in an angry or threatening manner.”61 
This firearm offense includes an explicit (and probably unnecessary) 
exception that cross-references Missouri’s self-defense statute.62 Thus, the 
pointing of an actually or apparently loaded firearm at another person is, in 
most hostile circumstances, at least facially both a misdemeanor and a felony 
under Missouri law. 
In addition, Missouri’s “licensed concealed carry” statute states that a 
licensee “may briefly and openly display the firearm to the ordinary sight of 
another person, unless the firearm is intentionally displayed in an angry or 
threatening manner, not in necessary self-defense.”63 Florida’s criminal 
firearm statutes contain an identical provision.64 Thus, Missouri’s and 
Florida’s criminal codes could be read as implying that some forms of display 
are lawful, even if direct pointing may not be.  
In Texas (where the Austin confrontation involving mutual display 
escalated to a shooting), the bar is set higher for an assault charge, requiring 
either the causing of physical injury or at least an intentional or knowing 
“threat” of “imminent” injury.65 It seems unlikely that a display amounting 
to an intended warning could satisfy this definition. However, Texas 
 
56. See supra note 4. 
57. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 752.863a (West 2019). 
58. Id. § 750.233(1). At least one Michigan prosecutor expressed concern that the addition of 
an intent requirement makes the brandishing prohibition duplicative of the general prohibition on 
assault. Alex Mitchell, Legal Uncertainties About Openly Carrying Guns in Michigan Present 
Challenges for Law Enforcement, MLIVE (Jan. 20, 2019), https://www.mlive.com/news/ 
kalamazoo/2014/05/open_carry.html [https://perma.cc/4FAC-4LST]. 
59. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.056 (West 2019). 
60. Id. § 565.054. 
61. Id. § 571.030. 
62. Id. § 571.030(5). 
63. Id. § 571.037. 
64. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.053(1) (West 2020). 
65. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1–2) (West 2020). 
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separately criminalizes “deadly conduct,” defined, at the misdemeanor level, 
as recklessly placing another in “imminent” danger of serious injury. The 
deadly conduct statute creates a presumption of both recklessness and danger 
“if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm at or in the direction of another.”66 
Texas law further defines as misdemeanor disorderly conduct “display[ing] 
a firearm or other deadly weapon in a public place in a manner calculated to 
alarm.”67 The Court of Criminal Appeals has clarified that not every alarming 
gun display qualifies; to violate the statute, “a person must intentionally and 
knowingly display a firearm in a public place in a manner that he knows is 
likely, under an objective standard of reasonableness, to frighten the average, 
ordinary person.”68 Thus, pointing a gun at another person in Texas is likely 
a misdemeanor crime in many circumstances, but Texas law also leaves room 
in at least some situations for rebutting a prosecutor’s arguments that the 
actor had a reckless state of mind and placed the other person in imminent 
danger.  
B.  Defenses 
Of course, virtually any situation in which a gun owner points a firearm 
at another person in a hostile encounter in a public place will generate a self-
defense claim by the gun owner. Not only is that the most obvious basis on 
which to defend against any allegation of assault or related firearm offense, 
but the concept of self-defense is at the very core of contemporary American 
gun (especially handgun) culture.69 
Again, consider the applicable rules in the jurisdictions previously 
discussed, which are fairly typical of the progression of self-defense law in 
states that have attempted to accommodate, in whole or in part, the agendas 
of gun-rights advocates. It should first be noted that self-defense, which 
eventually merged into the ancient common law defense of justification, is a 
general defense in most or all American jurisdictions. That is, while the 
elements of the defense can be demanding, one can at least assert a self-
 
66. Id. § 22.05; Amaro v. State, 287 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, pet. ref’d) 
(“[M]erely pointing a firearm in another’s direction can place that person in imminent danger of 
serious bodily injury.”). 
67. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(8) (West 2020). 
68. State v. Ross, 573 S.W.3d 817, 825 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). 
69. David Yamane, Paul Yamane & Sebastian L. Ivory, Targeted Advertising: Documenting 
the Emergence of Gun Culture 2.0 in Guns Magazine, 1955–2019, PALGRAVE COMMC’NS, Apr. 15, 
2020, at 1, 2, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-0437-0 [https://perma.cc/QQK4-S5TQ] 
(describing the shift in gun culture towards “Gun Culture 2.0,” which “centers on home and personal 
protection through armed citizenship, notably the legal carrying of concealed weapons, mostly 
handguns, in public by ordinary Americans”); Kate Masters, Fear of Other People Is Now the 
Primary Motivation for American Gun Ownership, a Landmark Survey Finds, TRACE (Sept. 19, 
2016), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/09/harvard-gun-ownership-study-self-defense/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Z42T-GNA7]. 
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defense claim against any charge whatsoever as long as force was plausibly 
necessary for self-protection.70 
Florida’s self-defense regime, which gained national attention following 
George Zimmerman’s killing of Trayvon Martin, begins with the 
longstanding principle inherited from the common law—that “[a] person is 
justified in using or threatening to use force . . . against another when and to 
the extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary 
to defend himself or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of 
unlawful force.”71  
Florida’s principal statutory innovation in the law of self-defense, like 
that of many other “stand your ground” states, is to modify the longstanding 
rules of retreat in self-defense law, which were designed to ensure that only 
strictly necessary uses of force would be legally justified. Whereas the 
common law and many older statutes deprived an actor of a self-defense 
claim if she could have avoided the threat to her safety by moving to another 
location (especially if she was not already in her home), the Florida regime 
states that the actor asserting self-defense has no duty to retreat and “has the 
right to stand his or her ground” and meet force with force if the actor is 
attacked in “a place where he or she has a right to be” (as, for example, in a 
store or public parking lot).72 Florida law further contains provisions that 
(1) create a presumption of the actor’s reasonable belief in imminent harm if 
a person is unlawfully entering the actor’s dwelling or vehicle,73 and 
(2) confusingly provide “immunity” from prosecution to persons whom the 
police conclude after investigation acted in self-defense.74 
Texas, like Florida, is a “stand your ground” state. Its criminal code 
provides that: (1) common law retreat principles do not apply if the actor has 
“a right to be present at the location where the force is used”;75 (2) the 
factfinder may not consider whether the actor did not retreat in determining 
 
70. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229–30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (providing a classic 
and thorough explication of the common law of self-defense). 
71. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.012(1) (West 2020). 
72. Id. § 776.012(2). 
73. Id. § 776.013(2)(a). 
74. Id. § 776.032(1–2). The oddity of Florida’s immunity provision is that in American criminal 
procedure, a claim of immunity is raised in a motion to dismiss before trial or sometimes, if the 
legal question of immunity turns on a factual dispute, before a jury at trial. Florida’s law appears to 
direct the police to make an extraordinary legal determination of immunity, in addition to the 
ordinary determination of probable cause, before deciding whether to arrest in the first instance. See 
Eliott C. McLaughlin, Prosecutor Overrules Sheriff, Charges Florida Man in ‘Stand Your Ground’ 
Case, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/13/us/stand-your-ground-
florida-shooting-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/3YYW-77UA] (quoting the Pinellas County 
sheriff, who stated: “To arrest, it must be so clear that, as a matter of law, ‘stand your ground’ does 
not apply in any way to the facts and circumstances that you’re presented with”). 
75. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(e) (West 2020). 
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whether the actor’s belief in the necessity of force was reasonable;76 and 
(3) when the use of force would otherwise be justifiable under the state’s self-
defense law, the threat to use force is also lawful.77 
In Michigan, a slightly different statutory scheme also establishes a 
version of the right to “stand your ground.” Michigan’s self-defense statute 
provides: 
An individual who has not or is not engaged in the commission of a 
crime at the time he or she uses force other than deadly force may use 
force other than deadly force against another individual anywhere he 
or she has the legal right to be with no duty to retreat if he or she 
honestly and reasonably believes that the use of that force is necessary 
to defend himself or herself or another individual from the imminent 
unlawful use of force by another individual.78 
Again, the “right to be” principle provides that there is no duty to retreat 
from a hostile encounter with another citizen in a public place, even if a safe 
retreat is possible.79 Judicial decisions explain that the obligation to retreat 
persists in Michigan only for persons who are initial aggressors in a 
confrontation, who are participants in agreed “mutual combat,” or who 
reinitiate hostilities after parties to a confrontation have retreated to safety.80 
Missouri law also begins from the basic common law principle of 
necessity, authorizing the defensive use of force when an actor “reasonably 
believes such force to be necessary to defend himself or herself or a third 
person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use 
 
76. Id. § 9.31(f). 
77. Id. § 9.04. 
78. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.972(2) (West 2019). 
79. The concept is freighted with some gendered normative significance, even in its alternative 
title of the “true man” defense. See Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199–200 (1876) (“[A] true man, 
who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant, who, by violence or surprise, maliciously 
seeks to take his life or do him enormous bodily harm.”); see also Mary Anne Franks, Real Men 
Advance, Real Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as 
Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1102 (2014) (arguing that Stand Your Ground laws, 
while purporting to benefit women, “actually reinforce and exacerbate existing gender divides in 
self-defense law that disproportionately harm women”); Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes 
from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 237, 240 (2008) (“[T]he modern Castle 
Doctrine leverages the subordinated woman into a general model of self-defense rooted in the 
imperative to protect the home and family from attack.”). 
80. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.973–.974 (West 2019); see also People v. Riddle, 649 
N.W.2d 30, 42, 42 n.25 (Mich. 2002) (explaining that Michigan law imposes an affirmative duty to 
retreat only “when the defendant was the voluntary participant in mutual combat” and that one who 
is the initial aggressor is generally not entitled to claim self-defense at all); People v. Montgomery, 
No. 309993, 2013 WL 2662378, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. June 13, 2013) (per curiam) (finding that the 
evidence did not support an instruction for self-defense when the defendant “chose to return and 
confront [the complainant] with a gun” after the initial aggressor had abandoned the fight and both 
parties had retreated to safety). 
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of unlawful force by such other person.”81 Missouri is also a “stand your 
ground” state, providing that a person has no duty to retreat while “in any . . . 
location such person has the right to be.”82 (To see the contrasting approach, 
consider the Model Penal Code, drafted in the 1960s, which imposes an 
obligation to retreat, even in the face of an unlawful demand to refrain from 
legally protected conduct, so long as the actor does not have a “duty” to be 
in the place in question.)83 
In Florida, Texas, Michigan, and Missouri, as in many other states, the 
burden of proof further favors claims of self-defense. The defendant need 
only meet a burden of production by introducing some evidence to inject the 
question of self-defense into the litigation, after which the prosecutor must 
disprove the affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doubt.84 Burdens of 
proof can be decisive in resolving the lawfulness of many violent encounters, 
as was likely the case in the prosecution and acquittal of George Zimmerman, 
if there are no eyewitnesses or video or audio records of the encounter. 
C.  Shortcomings 
While criminal law in many American jurisdictions is reasonably clear 
that pointing a firearm at a person during a confrontation in public can be a 
crime (at least at the misdemeanor level), it is extremely opaque—indeed, 
even intentionally noncommittal—about when such conduct will be a crime. 
This is so for two reasons, the second of which presents the greater problem. 
First, assault definitions often turn on difficult factual questions about the 
actor’s intent and the victim’s perceptions. Key to this difficulty is that, 
during a confrontation, both defensive pointing of a firearm and threatening 
pointing of a firearm generate reasonable fear in those at whom the gun is 
pointed. The difference in legality between the two scenarios may then turn 
on the beliefs and intentions of the person pointing the weapon.  
That leads to the second, more troublesome problem. Because all such 
encounters will, if treated as criminal cases, involve claims of self-defense, 
liability will almost always pivot on the actor’s “reasonable belief” in the 
necessity of displaying or pointing the gun. Some states, like Florida, make 
this a subjective inquiry for all practical purposes.85 Coupled with the 
 
81. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.031 (West 2019). 
82. Id. § 563.031(3). 
83. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 3.04(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
84. MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.031(5) (West 2019); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.03(c–d) (West 
2020); Mosansky v. State, 33 So. 3d 756, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (per curiam); People v. 
Dupree, 788 N.W.2d 399, 408–09 (Mich. 2010). 
85. See Elizabeth Esther Berenguer, The Color of Fear: A Cognitive-Rhetorical Analysis of How 
Florida’s Subjective Fear Standard in Stand Your Ground Cases Ratifies Racism, 76 MD. L. REV. 
726, 741 (2017) (“Although the reasonable person standard is the majority rule for most Stand Your 
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increasingly common rule that no person rightfully in a location is obliged to 
retreat to retain the defense, this means that the legality of pointing guns in 
public places is almost entirely a situational matter. To be sure, American 
self-defense law retains its commitment to the principle of proportional use 
of force as a subsidiary principle to necessity. Firing, and perhaps even 
pointing, a gun to ward off being jostled in a crowd, for example, should not 
give rise to any valid claim of self-defense. But proportionality itself turns on 
blurry notions of reasonable belief: pointing or even firing a gun might be 
reasonable if one person believes another to be armed or (as Zimmerman 
apparently argued with success) believes it necessary to fend off a manual 
attack that might end in a deadly blow. 
 Adding to the opacity of current law, stand-your-ground statutes elide 
questions of time and place when they impose no duty to retreat if the actor 
has “a right to be” in the place. How far can one go in placing oneself in a 
location and for a duration of time, fully armed, with the expectation or hope 
that a “necessity” to use deadly force might develop (as, for example, in the 
events preceding the deadly violence in Kenosha86)? To be sure, even newer 
statutes purport to deny “stand your ground” rights, as the older “castle 
doctrine” does, to individuals who provoke the threat necessitating self-
defense or who are found to be the “initial aggressor.” But whether a person 
who has “a right to be” in a place could also be found to be a provoker or 
aggressor because they hoped to find a confrontation that might justify self-
defense remains an entirely open question.87 
American criminal law provides exceedingly little ex ante guidance on 
how lawfully possessed firearms can and should be carried, displayed, 
brandished, pointed, and referred to in verbal statements. In broad terms, the 
conduct rule for firearm pointing amounts to something like: “[I]t will be 
lawful if a prosecutor cannot prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that 
you did not reasonably believe that you were in danger of being harmed.” In 
a country pervaded with guns, intense political hostilities, racial fears and 
divisiveness—and, at the moment, a frightening pandemic involving a deadly 
virus—what does it even mean to be “reasonable” in how one forms one’s 
fears, as an argument escalates on the sidewalk in front of a house or in a 
store parking lot?  
The increasing phenomenon of dozens and sometimes hundreds of 
armed individuals converging in one place exposes just how inadequate the 
 
Ground laws, Florida’s codified Stand Your Ground laws call for a subjective analysis.”); id. at 727 
(arguing that “subjective standards not only absolve negative race-based behaviors but actually 
ratify, condone, and perpetuate implicit biases and racist beliefs”). 
86. See supra note 10. 
87. See generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Stand Your Ground, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK 
OF APPLIED ETHICS AND CRIMINAL LAW 731 (Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan eds., 
2019) (examining possible moral justifications for “Stand Your Ground” laws). 
BLOCHER.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/2021 12:18 PM 
1190 Texas Law Review [Vol. 99:1173 
criminal law is in policing the boundary between protected gun use and 
prohibited gun crime. Whether these armed individuals assemble to protest, 
to protect, or just because they can, the presence of so many private firearms 
generates volatility that existing criminal law is incapable of reducing ex 
ante.  
All of these armed individuals can claim that they are in a place they 
have a right to be. Any of these individuals can claim that he brought a 
weapon in anticipation that counter-protestors or others would be similarly 
armed. And any one of them, if he points a weapon at another, can argue he 
is responding proportionately to the actual or apparent threat of other armed 
individuals. That these conflicts tend to be adjudicated only after someone 
pulls a trigger highlights the deficiencies of the existing criminal legal 
regime.  
In sum, the criminal law’s lines around gun displays are both thin and 
blurry. The prospects that this regime could even punish people in a 
principled manner, much less establish viable rules for the handling of 
firearms at a protest, on the road, in a parking lot, and at a store, are extremely 
dim. This worrying picture emerges simply from the face of the applicable 
laws and a few recent examples. The problem looks even worse in light of 
the chronically capricious and racialized exercise of discretion in police 
departments and prosecutors’ offices in fifty states and hundreds of cities and 
counties. 
Just as we noted that threat perceptions are themselves racialized and 
prone to bias, so too are law enforcement’s attempts to crack down on crime, 
particularly gun crime. The enforcement disparities are stark with easily 
proven gun possession charges, where African Americans are far more likely 
to be charged with unlawful possession than white Americans.88 Given the 
added difficulty of charges for gun-pointing offenses, it stands to reason that 
systematic biases will systematically favor white Americans over African 
Americans. Recent events involving white, armed, self-proclaimed militias 
allowed to operate freely in public support this hypothesis.89  
 
88. See, e.g., Benjamin Levin, Guns and Drugs, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2173, 2194–97 (2016) 
(recounting statistics of racial disparities in weapons-offense arrests but adding the caveat that we 
do not have good data on the underlying number of offenses that are not charged). 
89. For example, none of the gun carriers who stormed the Michigan legislature in April 2020 
were arrested, despite broad acknowledgement that some of their actions were threatening and 
intimidating. See Sarah Rahal & Craig Mauger, Armed Protesters in Michigan Capitol  
Have Lawmakers Questioning Policy, DET. NEWS (May 3, 2020, 12:24 AM), https://www 
.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/michigan/2020/05/02/armed-protesters-michigan-capitol-have-
lawmakers-questioning-policy/3071928001/ [https://perma.cc/Z6B2-KXW3] (quoting Michigan 
State Senate Majority Leader Mike Shirkey as condemning armed protestors who “used intimidation 
and the threat of physical harm to stir up fear and feed rancor”); see also Michael German, Hidden 
in Plain Sight: Racism, White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in Law Enforcement, BRENNAN 
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III.  The Shadow of the Second Amendment 
The previous Part canvassed the relevant rules of criminal law and 
showed how they are inadequate to fully manage public interactions that 
seem increasingly to involve gun displays. But any discussion of guns in the 
United States must also ask to what extent the right to keep and bear arms 
shapes behavior and influences the contours of criminal law. In the context 
of gun displays, this could happen in two ways: (1) doctrinal rules that restrict 
the state’s ability to punish conduct, and (2) constitutional rhetoric that 
shapes ancillary doctrines and public understanding. There is no freestanding 
constitutional right to threaten another person with a gun. However, criminal 
law’s indeterminacy is compounded by constitutional law, which is rapidly 
making the norms and laws surrounding arms display and bearing unstable 
and hotly contested. 
A.  The Second Amendment’s Limited Doctrinal Role 
In District of Columbia v. Heller,90 the Supreme Court struck down a 
D.C. law banning handgun possession in the home. The law had been passed 
at a time of skyrocketing firearm violence that was chiefly affecting  
the District’s large black community.91 In response to endemic 
underenforcement of violent crimes involving black victims, the D.C. law 
was designed to show, in James Forman’s words, that “at least in D.C., the 
killing of black men mattered.”92 But the mores and discourse around 
firearms changed considerably between the city council’s decision in 1975 
and the Supreme Court’s decision in 2008.93 
Writing for the Court in Heller, Justice Scalia concluded that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms unconnected 
to service in a militia. And the “central component” of that right is the interest 
 
CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/hidden-
plain-sight-racism-white-supremacy-and-far-right-militancy-law [https://perma.cc/V5FB-KRBZ] 
(citing FBI counterterrorism policy documents and other sources documenting “active links” 
between militia and white supremacist groups and law enforcement officers). 
90. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
91. JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA 57 (2017) (observing that in 1975, “85 percent of those killed by guns in the District of 
Columbia were black, and so were a similar percentage of murder suspects”); see also Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Criminal Justice and the Mattering of Lives, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (2018) 
(“African Americans bore the brunt of a crime wave sweeping D.C. and much of the nation. 
Handguns made the crisis lethal, threatening black communities—especially the poor among 
them—in ways that made the turn to criminal law irresistible.” (internal citations omitted)). 
92. FORMAN, supra note 91, at 74. 
93. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192 (2008) (arguing that “Heller’s originalism enforces 
understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged in the late twentieth century through 
popular constitutionalism”). 
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in self-defense.94 D.C.’s law violated the Constitution because it banned the 
firearm most frequently chosen for self-defense and extended into the home, 
“where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”95 So 
did D.C.’s separate requirement that other firearms be kept locked or 
disassembled at all times; notably, the Court refused to accept the District’s 
argument that the statute retained a self-defense exception that would allow 
a person to unlock her weapon when faced with a threat.96  
But the majority opinion in Heller also emphasized that the right to keep 
and bear arms has limits, and that a potentially wide range of “longstanding” 
gun regulations are constitutionally permissible.97 The Court invoked 
Blackstone, for example, as support for the government’s power to ban 
“dangerous and unusual” weapons.98 And so it is worth noting that in the 
cited passage, Blackstone concluded that “riding or going armed, with 
dangerous or unusual weapons, is a crime against the public peace, by 
terrifying the good people of the land.”99 That theme of protecting “the good 
people” from terror became a focus of early American gun laws as well, as 
manifest in the brandishing laws adopted—and still on the books—
throughout the United States.100  
Heller, then, seemed to tie the Second Amendment to notions of self-
defense, albeit in an odd way. The Court did not purport to change or augment 
the traditional doctrine of self-defense, but to vindicate that doctrine by 
limiting regulations on a technology used in its performance. But, as Eric 
Ruben has shown, the common law doctrine of self-defense is cabined in 
ways that gun-rights advocates and activists, not to mention Heller itself, 
seldom acknowledge.101 The doctrine traditionally requires the force used to 
be necessary and proportional and, as a procedural matter, the defense is 
adjudicated during a criminal trial, not through ex ante immunities from 
arrest or prosecution.102 There’s a noticeable tension between Heller’s focus 
 
94. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. 
95. Id. at 628–29. 
96. Id. at 630. 
97. Id. at 626–27. 
98. Id. at 627 (“We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of 
prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons.’”). 
99. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 149 (emphasis omitted). 
100. See Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law History in the United States and Second Amendment 
Rights, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2017, at 55, 63 (describing early American brandishing 
laws); see also Joseph Blocher & Reva B. Siegel, When Guns Threaten the Public Sphere: A New 
Account of Public Safety Regulation Under Heller, 116 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
(manuscript at 27–28), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3764258 (discussing 
the longstanding and broadly enacted laws against brandishing weapons). 
101. Eric Ruben, An Unstable Core: Self-Defense and the Second Amendment, 108 CALIF. L. 
REV. 63, 67 (2020). 
102. Id. 
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on ready handgun access and the ultimate goal of self-defense law to 
“shepherd conflicts away from lethal violence.”103 
A federal district court in Illinois recently confronted Heller’s 
ambiguous relationship with the traditional rules of armed self-defense.104 
There, a Chicago police dispatcher sued the City after she was fired for 
shooting another motorist during an off-duty altercation. She claimed that the 
City’s action violated the Second Amendment because she was engaged in 
lawful self-defense. Rejecting that connection, the court held that “historical 
legal commentary and custom indicate that the question of whether a 
particular actual use of a gun constitutes self-defense is a question left to 
criminal and tort law, about which the Second Amendment is silent.” It 
therefore dismissed the claim that the firing constituted retaliation for the 
exercise of a constitutional right.105  
Although Heller addressed a home handgun ban, the Supreme Court 
declared that the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to 
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”106 As a result, the 
Constitution may impose limits on a state’s authority to criminalize carrying 
firearms in public. In Moore v. Madigan,107 the Seventh Circuit held just 
that.108 Heller unmistakably implied, said Judge Richard Posner, that “the 
constitutional right of armed self-defense” extends beyond keeping a gun in 
one’s house.109 And perhaps the Constitution has something to say about how 
firearms can be carried in public.110 
Heller, then, clearly does take “certain policy choices off the table.”111 
Given current doctrine, a state likely cannot attack the destabilizing presence 
of guns in public by keeping them all homebound, though a wide range of 
time, place, and manner-type restrictions are still available, as are some 
 
103. Id. at 68. 
104. Calderone v. City of Chicago, No. 18 C 7866, 2019 WL 4450496, *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 
2019), aff’d No. 19-2858, 2020 WL 6500933 (7th Cir. Nov. 5, 2020). 
105. Id. at *1–4; see also id. at *4 (“The Court is unaware of any authority indicating that the 
Second Amendment is relevant to the question of under what circumstances violent action is legally 
justified as self-defense.”). 
106. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). 
107. 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012). 
108. Id. at 942. 
109. Id. at 935. 
110. See Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth Century 
Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486 (2014) (articulating historical constitutional 
understandings of the right to both the open and the concealed carry of firearms outside the home). 
But see Young v. Hawaii, No. 12-17808, 2021 WL 1114180, at *3 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2021) (en 
banc)  (holding that there is no unregulated right to carry firearms in public). 
111. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008). 
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criminal sanctions on their unlawful display.112 Despite the widening sphere 
of protected activity, there has been to date no major constitutional challenge 
to laws that criminalize conduct such as assault with a deadly weapon, 
brandishing, or other threatening gun displays.113 The few cases thus far do 
not suggest these laws are in constitutional jeopardy. For example, in Quigley 
v. City of Huntington, 114 the court quickly rejected a claim that the state’s 
brandishing statute violated the Second Amendment.115 Nor was the statute 
unconstitutionally vague, because “[b]randishing a weapon is commonly 
understood as holding or waiving a weapon in the presence of someone in an 
intimidating manner.”116 Another federal court similarly rejected the claim 
that a landowner’s displaying a weapon to warn her neighbor not to trespass 
was protected conduct: “neither Heller nor McDonald forbids any State from 
imposing reasonable restrictions on the use of weapons to eject or prevent 
trespassers.”117 State courts interpreting their own constitutional arms-rights 
provisions have likewise rejected challenges to these types of laws.118  
B.  The Constitution’s Rhetorical Power and Expressive Effect 
Laws regulating brandishing and similar conduct present no formal 
conflict with the right to keep and bear arms—at least under Heller’s logic 
and the lower courts’ jurisprudence to date. But the Second Amendment 
supplies more than just a formal constitutional barrier to gun regulation; it 
serves as a powerful rhetorical weapon. The Second Amendment is often 
 
112. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down Illinois’ statewide 
prohibition on public carry—the only such statewide law in the country). But see Darrell A.H. 
Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 
1297 (2009) (arguing that a homebound right is consistent with Heller). 
113. David B. Kopel & Clayton Cramer, State Court Standards of Review for the Right to Keep 
and Bear Arms, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1113, 1129 (2010) (stating, in an article defending strong 
gun rights, that criminalizing conduct such as brandishing a weapon “would not violate the Second 
Amendment”). Cf. Reid Golden, Loaded Questions: A Suggested Constitutional Framework for the 
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 96 MINN. L. REV. 2182, 2202 n.117 (2012) (arguing in favor of a 
First Amendment framework for Second Amendment questions and stating: “Firing or even 
brandishing a firearm in a public place, without the rare justification presented in a legitimate self-
defense scenario, is of course lawless and not an individual right within the meaning of the Second 
Amendment.”). 
114. No. 3:17-CV-1906, 2020 WL 1527792 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 30, 2020). 
115. Id. at *5. 
116. Id. at *6. 
117. Saldinger v. Santa Cruz Cty. Super. Court, No. C 10-3147 SBA PR, 2010 WL 3339512, 
at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2010). 
118. See Ex parte Poe, 491 S.W.3d 348, 355 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2016, pet. ref’d) (“We 
conclude that although there clearly are constitutional rights to bear arms and to express oneself 
freely, there is no constitutionally protected right to display a firearm in a public place in a manner 
that is calculated to alarm.”); State v. Spencer, 876 P.2d 939, 942 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting 
challenge to law that “only prohibits the carrying or displaying of weapons when objective 
circumstances would warrant alarm in a reasonable person”); State v. Daniel, 391 S.E.2d 90, 97 
(W. Va. 1990) (rejecting constitutional challenge to brandishing statute). 
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invoked by lawmakers—and understood by private actors—to protect gun-
involved activities (including displays) that Heller would permit to be 
regulated.119 
Probably the most prominent constitutionally inflected criminal statutes 
are the growing number of stand-your-ground laws. When Florida kicked off 
the recent spike in such laws in 2004, its supporters—including most notably 
the National Rifle Association—expressly invoked the constitutional right to 
armed self-defense. As discussed above, stand-your-ground laws typically 
eliminate the duty to retreat even when safe to do so, lower the bar to the use 
of deadly force, and invert the normal rules of criminal defenses, putting the 
onus on the state to disprove that the person was acting in reasonable self-
defense before even making an arrest.120 Advocates for such laws—and 
sometimes the laws themselves—invoke the language of the right to armed 
self-defense. By including a confusing “immunity” provision in its law, and 
tying it to Second Amendment rights, Florida signaled its willingness to cloak 
in constitutionally inflected language what might have formerly been 
criminal conduct involving guns.  
These laws have a tangible effect on citizens’ actions and responses.121 
Take the case of Texan Joe Horn. In 2007, Horn shot and killed two men 
stealing property from his neighbor’s home. Horn had seen the men 
burglarizing the house and called 911 to report the theft. Despite the 
emergency dispatcher’s admonition that he stay in his home and await police, 
and that property theft is not worth shooting someone over, Horn insisted he 
would not let the men get away. Citing a change in Texas’s self-defense law 
just two months earlier, Horn declared: “the laws have been changed . . . 
since September the first, and I have a right to protect myself.” He stepped 
 
119. See, e.g., JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A.H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND 
AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER 3–4 (2018) (noting that political 
and rhetorical discussions of the Second Amendment are often erroneously overbroad as compared 
to current constitutional doctrine); Jacob D. Charles, Securing Gun Rights By Statute: The Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms Outside the Constitution, 120 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript 
at 1–4), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3789216 (charting the ways that 
legislatures have invoked the Second Amendment to expand statutory protection for gun-related 
conduct); Adam Winkler, Is the Second Amendment Becoming Irrelevant?, 93 IND. L.J. 253, 253 
(2018) (stating that “[t]here is a Judicial Second Amendment comprised of court decisions 
interpreting the provision, and there is an Aspirational Second Amendment that is used in political 
dialogue . . . ,” which “is far more hostile to gun laws than the judicial one,” “overtaking the Judicial 
Second Amendment in American law”). 
120. CAROLINE E. LIGHT, STAND YOUR GROUND: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR 
WITH LETHAL SELF-DEFENSE 161–62 (2017). 
121. See, e.g., Brandon W. Barnett, Misunderstanding Stand Your Ground and the Castle 
Doctrine, OPEN CARRY TEX. (Jan. 20, 2016), https://opencarrytexas.wordpress.com/2016/01/20
/misunderstanding-stand-your-ground-and-the-castle-doctrine/ [https://perma.cc/7L9B-6AHK] 
(describing “a common misunderstanding” of stand-your-ground laws created by news reports is 
that “the law grants the average citizen complete freedom to use any type of force, including deadly 
force, as a self-help remedy, whenever one feels threatened”). 
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out, confronted the men, and shot and killed them both, later saying “I had 
no choice.” Police arrived just seconds later, but Horn was not arrested or 
indicted by a grand jury that later evaluated the case, so there was never a 
need for him to claim self-defense or invoke the state’s new stand-your-
ground law.122 But he apparently believed that the law authorized—maybe 
even encouraged—him to initiate an armed confrontation, which ultimately 
resulted in two deaths. 
As Mary Anne Franks observes, the influence of stand-your-ground and 
other similar laws “cannot be fully captured only by the outcomes of specific 
cases.”123 The public imagination, shaped and informed by media reporting, 
advocacy, and constitutional rhetoric, gives such laws a life beyond the four 
corners of a statute.124 As in the killings by Horn and George Zimmerman, 
“[t]he promotion of a shoot-first mentality has deadly consequences even if 
individual defendants fail to raise or succeed on” such a defense in a 
particular case.125 We might say the same for a mentality that focuses on the 
prerogatives of public gun-bearers to the detriment of others. A brandish-first 
mentality may be just as toxic because the mental barriers to such actions are 
much lower than to pulling a trigger, but the trauma it inflicts and the chilling 
effect it imparts can be real and lasting.  
The St. Louis couple’s actions illustrate well this concern. When Circuit 
Attorney Kimberly M. Gardner announced charges against the couple 
displaying their guns to passing protestors in July 2020, she invoked the 
state’s law criminalizing waving weapons in a threatening manner.126 “We 
must protect the right to peacefully protest,” Gardner said, “and any attempt 
to chill it through intimidation or threat of deadly force will not be 
tolerated.”127 State Attorney General Eric Schmitt shot back, “this is a case 
where the prosecutor contends that exercising the right to keep and bear arms 
 
122. See Patrick Michels, Joe Horn and Five Years with the Texas Castle Doctrine, TEX. 
OBSERVER (May 8, 2012, 7:29 PM), https://www.texasobserver.org/joe-horn-and-castle-doctrine-
shootings-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/A32T-RX5S] (describing Joe Horn’s armed encounter with 
burglars in his neighborhood). 
123. MARY ANNE FRANKS, THE CULT OF THE CONSTITUTION 97 (2019). 
124. See Pamela Cole Bell, Stand Your Ground Laws: Mischaracterized, Misconstrued, and 
Misunderstood, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 383, 427 (2015) (criticizing opponents of stand-your-ground 
laws for characterizing them as “shoot first” and “license to kill” laws and contending that “[c]ritics 
who continue to make these deliberate misrepresentations run the risk of creating the very effect 
they decry”). 
125. FRANKS, supra note 123, at 97. 
126. See Paybarah & Ortiz, supra note 5 (explaining that, according to the Circuit Attorney’s 
Office in St. Louis, exhibiting a semiautomatic rifle in “an angry or threatening manner” was 
sufficient to charge Mark and Patricia McCloskey with unlawful use of a weapon). 
127. Tom Jackman, St. Louis Couple Who Aimed Guns at Protesters Charged with Felony 
Weapons Count, WASH. POST (July 20, 2020, 7:33 PM), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/nation/2020/07/20/st-louis-couple-who-aimed-guns-protesters-charged-with-felony-weapons 
-count/ [https://perma.cc/B22L-GSXA]. 
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in self-defense—one of Missouri’s most fundamental freedoms—is itself a 
crime.”128 He explicitly connected the couple’s statutory and constitutional 
rights. The “castle doctrine,” Schmitt wrote, “is not merely a creature of 
statute, but is deeply rooted in—and implements—the constitutional right to 
keep and bear arms” in the state constitution.129 And it need not be vindicated 
in response to a criminal charge, he argued, because “[e]xhibiting a weapon 
in an act of valid self-defense is not a crime at all.”130 
The St. Louis case has echoes of a 2004 case in Florida that set off the 
spread of stand-your-ground laws across the country. In that earlier Florida 
case, a man who shot an intruder faced legal uncertainty for several months 
as police investigated the incident.131 (They ultimately cleared him.)132 
Lawmakers, however, were outraged at this state of legal limbo, and 
concluded that only a blanket immunity from arrest, prosecution, and trial 
would adequately protect the right of “law-abiding citizen[s]” to threaten, 
display, and ultimately fire weapons when they perceive a threat.133  
The Constitution’s role in the debate over laws criminalizing gun-
pointing is more expressive than doctrinal. There is nothing in the text, 
history, judicial interpretation, or scholarly commentary concerning the 
Second Amendment to suggest it prevents a state from outlawing brandishing 
or assault with a deadly weapon. A self-defense exception might be 
constitutionally required, but it is entirely possible such a defense would be 
required without the Second Amendment.134 The rhetorical reliance on the 
Second Amendment nonetheless imbues these arguments with powerful 
symbolic force. 
The central problem of the Second Amendment in this expressive sense 
is that it has the potential to aggravate the risk of dangerous norm cascades 
under the banner of a constitutional right. We have discussed how an optimal 
equilibrium on gun display is unlikely given the behavioral data on how 
individuals identify (and misidentify) threat and risk. And the machinery of 
criminal law is not currently geared to arrest the slide into a sub-optimal 
outcome or address the distributional effects of gun displays. Second 
 
128. Amicus Brief of Attorney General Eric Schmitt Supporting Dismissal of the Case, at 4, 
Missouri v. McCloskey, No. 2022-CR01300 (Mo. July 20, 2020). 
129. Id. at 8. 
130. Id. at 10. 
131. LIGHT, supra note 120, at 156–57. 
132. Id. at 157. 
133. Id. 
134. See Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and 
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1821 (2007) (arguing that, under Supreme Court 
doctrine, “a right to self-defense (though potentially limitable by gun control laws) should be 
recognized even without reliance on the Second Amendment”); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 
U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (stating in dicta that a right for a jury to consider self-defense may be 
“fundamental”). 
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Amendment politics seem to exacerbate the risks. Even if nothing prevents a 
state from prohibiting, for example, guns at protests, the mere idea that the 
Second Amendment not only permits but encourages their display can lead 
to the very kind of lethal gun use that occurred in Austin and Kenosha, and 
which the criminal law can only practically address after bullets have flown.  
Conclusion 
Existing criminal law is not up to the challenge of regulating gun 
displays as they are increasingly practiced in public spaces in the United 
States. The Second Amendment does not mandate this state of affairs as a 
matter of legal doctrine, but does likely contribute—through its rhetorical and 
expressive power—to broad misunderstandings about the legal status and 
social value of gun displays. The more expansive the right to keep and bear 
arms becomes, the more pressure it will place on the existing criminal law to 
mitigate the costs of detrimental gun-related behavior—a task that it is not 
currently equipped to do. For example, the more places persons have rights 
to congregate with guns, the more public policy will have to rely on 
menacing, breach of the peace, or criminal trespass. The greater the range of 
the weapon, the more the law enforcement regime will have to lean on crimes 
like terrorizing, inducing panic, or assault. 
What, then, can be done?  
One possibility is to revisit criminal rules and attempt to make them 
clearer—not only so that people can feel more secure, but so that gun-bearers 
can better understand the extent of their legal rights. Some of the 
complications here are unavoidable, such as the need for a self-defense 
exception and the attendant fact- and situation-specific inquiries into 
reasonableness of threat perception, mens rea, and the like. But more bright-
line rules about when and how a gun can be employed in those situations 
would certainly be desirable. Perhaps some lessons could be learned from 
ongoing police reform efforts: While it is far from clear that there is anything 
like a standard rule about when police officers can unholster their weapons,135 
there have been efforts in the past to require such a rule,136 and the current 
national debate about police violence might put such regulations back on the 
agenda.  
A second way to rein in undesirable gun displays would be to encourage 
the role and power of private actors like business owners. It is notable, and 
not surprising, that many reported gun displays happen in parking lots  
 
135. Rhonda Fanning, Are There Rules for When Officers Unholster Their Firearms? Pt. 1, 
TEX. STANDARD (Aug. 11, 2015, 10:47 AM), https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/are-there-
rules-for-when-officers-unholster-their-firearms/ [https://perma.cc/V6VU-WXEE]. 
136. William K. Rashbaum, Police Will Review Policy on When to Draw Guns, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 31, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/31/nyregion/police-will-review-policy-on-
when-to-draw-guns.html [https://perma.cc/6MFK-G4TU]. 
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and stores—places where strangers come into contact with one another, and 
tempers may flare. As private property owners are exempt from the Second 
Amendment and largely free to set their own rules regarding firearms,137 
businesses and employers can—and many do—forbid the carrying of 
weapons on their property. Indeed, an increasing number of prominent 
retailers, from Walmart to Dick’s Sporting Goods, have announced gun-
restrictive policies in recent years.138 This “private gun regulation” is among 
the most important current developments shaping the practice of gun carrying 
in the United States.  
The third possibility—the most important and most difficult—is to wage 
directly the battle over social norms with the objective of reaching a new and 
safer equilibrium. Public debate about social practices, more than changes in 
legal doctrine, has the potential to either normalize or limit the spread of 
socially undesirable gun displays.139 That debate is playing out against a 
complex mix of social forces, not all of them gun-specific. At a time when 
anxiety is at unprecedented levels,140 gun sales are at all-time highs,141 fear 
of others has eclipsed recreation and hunting as the primary reason for gun 
ownership,142 and there is a concerted effort to expand the legality and 
practice of open carry,143 the social expectations about when it is acceptable 
to display a weapon are changing in complicated ways.  
 
137. We say “largely” because some states do impose rules regarding signage and the like. See, 
e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 30.06–07 (West 2020). 
138. See Dominic Rushe, Walmart and Dick’s Sporting Goods Put New Limits on Gun Sales, 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2018, 10:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/feb/28/dicks-
sporting-goods-guns-assault-rifle [https://perma.cc/L8AY-Q5DR]. 
139. Robert VerBruggen, Does Kyle Rittenhouse Have a Self-Defense Claim?, NAT’L REV. 
(Aug. 28, 2020, 11:14 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/08/does-kyle-rittenhouse-have-
a-self-defense-claim/ [https://perma.cc/CNL8-T337]. VerBruggen explained: 
The outcome for each shooting will depend on whether Rittenhouse reasonably feared 
for his life, which in turn might depend on broader context we lack thus far—and even 
if all three shootings were justified, there are still firearms and reckless-endangerment 
charges for him to contend with. Where the f*** were this kid’s parents? 
Id. 
140. Linda Searing, 60 Percent of U.S. Adults Are Feeling Daily Stress and Worry, New Gallup 
Poll Shows, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/60-
percent-of-us-adults-are-feeling-daily-stress-and-worry-new-gallup-poll-shows/2020/04/17
/13ce9d8a-7ffd-11ea-a3ee-13e1ae0a3571_story.html [https://perma.cc/V6YX-4546]. 
141. Brakkton Booker, Amid Protests and Virus Fears, Firearm Background Checks Hit All-
Time High, NPR (July 2, 2020, 3:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-
racial-justice/2020/07/02/886545589/amid-virus-fears-and-protests-firearm-background-checks-
hit-all-time-high [https://perma.cc/BDV9-HSSK]. 
142. Art Swift, Personal Safety Top Reason Americans Own Guns Today, GALLUP (Oct. 28, 
2013), https://news.gallup.com/poll/165605/personal-safety-top-reason-americans-own-guns-
today.aspx [https://perma.cc/5JPY-JKKX] (“[T]hose who already own firearms mention personal 
safety/protection most frequently as a reason for ownership (60%), followed by hunting, at 36%.”). 
143. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
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Of course, those social baselines are themselves shaped by law and how 
officials use their discretion to enforce law, including the loosening of public 
carry restrictions and the expansion of no-retreat self-defense rules that 
privilege the use of guns and might—as in the case of Joe Horn—encourage 
violent activity. Our point is that the social norms, shaped as they are by 
public and private actors, may in turn have important implications for case 
outcomes precisely because the applicable legal standards involve questions 
like whether one person’s fear of another’s gun was “reasonable” in the 
circumstances. The charging discretion of even the most careful enforcers, in 
all but the clearest of cases, will inevitably be influenced by the social and 
political forces bearing on virtually any case that has drawn media attention.  
We are skeptical that the invisible hand of the market will lead to an 
optimal or equitable equilibrium concerning gun displays.144 Absent a better 
and more stable legal regime concerning gun display, the United States is 
edging toward hazardous norm cascades with respect to public weaponry and 
the realization of catastrophic tail risks with their presence in everyday life. 
Law cannot be the ultimate solution in this story. But it needs updating, as a 
brake on a gun-carrying society that feels, to many, more coarse and 
menacing by the day. 
 
144. See supra Part I; see also BLOCHER & MILLER, supra note 119, at 151–59 (exploring the 
notion of a Second Amendment “marketplace of violence” akin to the First Amendment’s 
“marketplace of ideas”). 
